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Abstract
In some recent papers, Cobreros, Egré, Ripley and van Rooij have defended the idea that
abandoning transitivity may lead to a solution to the trouble caused by semantic paradoxes.
For that purpose, they develop the Strict-Tolerant approach, which leads them to entertain
a non-transitive theory of truth, where the structural rule of Cut is not generally valid.
However, that Cut fails in general in the target theory of truth does not mean that there
are not certain safe instances of Cut involving semantic notions. In this paper we intend to
meet the challenge of answering how to regain all the safe instances of Cut, in the language
of the theory, making essential use of a unary recovery operator. To fulfill this goal, we
will work within the so-called Goodship Project, which suggests that in order to have non-
trivial naïve theories it is sufficient to formulate the corresponding self-referential sentences
with suitable biconditionals. Nevertheless, a secondary aim of this paper is to propose a
novel way to carry this project out, showing that the biconditionals in question can be
totally classical. In the context of this paper, these biconditionals will be essentially used
in expressing the self-referential sentences and, thus, as a collateral result of our work we
will prove that none of the recoveries expected of the target theory can be non-trivially
achieved if self-reference is expressed through identities.
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1 Introduction
In some recent papers, Cobreros, Egré, Ripley and van Rooij have defended the idea that
abandoning transitivity may lead to a solution to the trouble caused by semantic paradoxes.
For that purpose, they develop the Strict-Tolerant approach, which leads them to consider the
logic ST used to later build a non-transitive theory of truth which we will hereinafter call
STTT.1 Throughout the authors’ works, the non-transitive project has proved to have many
1Non-transitive approaches to logical consequence were discussed, previously, in many works to which the
authors refer in their papers. Some of these are due to Strawson (as referred in [43] and [39], and linked to ST
for the first time in the recent paper [13]), Tennant [40], [41], Weir [44], Cook [18] and Frankowski [23]. But
it should be highlighted that the application of this logical approach to semantics paradoxical phenomena is
original of Cobreros, Egré, Ripley and van Rooij—although the approach applied by Zardini in [45] to deal with
the sorites paradox is non-transitive, too.
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attractive features. One of the most fundamental is something that might come as a surprise,
namely that it gives up Cut without thereby abandoning Classical Logic, for the championed
non-transitive theory of truth and Classical Logic coincide at the inferential level—that is, they
have the same set of valid inferences.
Yet, Cut needs to be given up to non-trivially handle a naïve truth predicate: it is precisely
this failure that saves the day when we attempt to reproduce a derivation of e.g. the Liar
paradox. However, that Cut does not apply with full generality does not mean that there are
no safe instances of Cut. This observation is crucial for many reasons, e.g. given the natural
link Cut has with the transitivity of deduction and the decidability of certain systems. Thus,
it will be interesting to highlight those places where it can be safely employed. We might want
to get as much Cut as we can, even if we cannot get it all. The aim of this paper is to meet
the challenge of answering how to recover the safe instances of Cut, within the language of the
theory itself.
To do this, we will expand the language of the target non-transitive theory of truth with a
unary recovery operator, that will allow us to regain not only these safe instances of Cut, but
also to recover other things that we may have lost when adopting STTT. Now, some may worry
that introducing enough expressive resources to recover the safe instances of Cut will inevitably
result in potential revenge paradoxes. We will take care of these worries with a great deal of
detail, showing how the specifics of the (non-)triviality results depend on the way self-reference
is achieved. To this extent, we will be following Laura Goodship’s recommendation that in order
to have fully expressive non-trivial naïve theories (e.g. naïve theories of truth) it is sufficient
to express these matters with a suitable conditional. However, we will diverge from Goodship
in a relevant respect. While she suggested that for the conditional to be suitable it should
invalidate either Modus Ponens or contraction—thus being sub-classical—we will show that it is
possible to express self-reference with a completely classical conditional, if the underlying logic
is non-transitive. As a collateral result of our work, we will prove that none of the recoveries
expected of the target theory can be non-trivially achieved if self-reference is expressed through
identities, instead of through equivalences.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we present the logic ST and the non-
transitive theory of truth STTT. In Section 3 we outline our proposal to recover the safe
instances of Cut, along with the question of whether or not the project leads to triviality. In
Section 4 we show that if self-referential sentences are expressed through equivalences the project
can be non-trivially entertained, constructing furthermore a non-trivial valuation for the target
theory, discussing its connection with the Goodship Project and drawing some philosophical
reflections thereby. In Section 5 we provide a sound and complete three-sided sequent calculus
for our system. Finally, in Section 6 we provide some concluding remarks.
2 A non-transitive transparent theory of truth
In what follows we will consider the non-transitive theory of truth STTT. But, first, we need to
understand its underlying logic, ST. It is usually presented as a first order logic, but for the sake
of simplicity, we will deal with a propositional version of these systems and their expansions.2
To move forward, it will be helpful to fix some definitions first. If L is a propositional
language, then with FOR(L) we will denote the absolutely free algebra of L, whose universe is
FOR(L). As usual, we will let Γ,∆, and other Greek capital letters represent sets of formulae, or
sets of inferences, and Roman capital letters A,B,C represent formulae themselves, or inferences
2For an extensive presentation of ST, see [14], [36], [37] and [16].
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themselves.3
The logic ST can be presented as a p-logic, as devised by Frankowski in [23] as a means to
characterize logical systems where valid derivations are such that the degree of strength of the
conclusions can be smaller than that of the premises.4
Definition 2.1 ([23]). A p-consequence relation over a propositional language L is a relation
 ⊆ ℘(FOR(L))× ℘(FOR(L)) obeying the following conditions for all Γ,∆ ⊆ FOR(L):
1. Γ  ∆ if Γ ∩∆ 6= ∅ (Reflexivity)
2. If Γ  ∆, then Γ,Γ′  ∆,∆′ (Monotonicity)
Additionally, a p-consequence relation  is substitution-invariant whenever if Γ  ∆, and σ is a
substitution on FOR(L), then {σ(B) | B ∈ Γ}  {σ(A) | A ∈ ∆}.
Definition 2.2 ([23]). A p-logic over a propositional language L is an ordered pair (FOR(L),),
where  is a substitution-invariant p-consequence relation.
In general, p-logics can be associated to p-matrices as follows, with the help of valuation
functions, i.e. homomorphisms from FOR(L) to the set of truth-values of the p-matrix in
question.
Definition 2.3 ([24]). For L a propositional language, an L-p-matrix is a structure 〈V,D+,D−,O〉,
such that 〈V,O〉 is an algebra of the same similarity type as L, with universe V and a set of
operations O, where D+,D− ⊆ V and D+ ⊆ D−.
Definition 2.4 ([21]). An inference or sequent on L, written Γ⇒ ∆, is an ordered pair (Γ,∆)
where Γ,∆ ⊆ FOR(L) are finite and possibly empty. SEQ(L) is the set of all sequents on L.
Definition 2.5. ForM a p-matrix, anM-valuation v satisfies a sequent or inference Γ ⇒ ∆,
written v M Γ⇒ ∆, by letting
v M Γ⇒ ∆ iff if v(B) ∈ D+ for all B ∈ Γ, then v(A) ∈ D− for some A ∈ ∆
A sequent or inference Γ⇒ ∆ isM-valid, written M Γ⇒ ∆, by letting
M Γ⇒ ∆ iff for allM-valuations v, v M Γ⇒ ∆
Notice, then, that we may interchangeably refer to an inference Γ⇒ ∆ that is valid in the logic
L induced by the matrix M, as Γ M A or M Γ ⇒ ∆. Moreover, when the matrix M is
essentially associated with the logic L we may alternatively denote M as L.
Furthermore, given the previous definitions, we can present ST as a p-matrix logic associated
to the 3-element Kleene algebra.
Definition 2.6. The 3-element Kleene algebra is the structure
K = 〈{1, 1
2
, 0}, {f¬K, f∧K, f∨K}〉
where the functions f¬K, f
∧
K, f
∨
K are as follows
3Though we hope the context will make things clear enough, we will always clearly state whether, for example,
Roman capital letters A,B,C represent formulae themselves, or inferences themselves.
4It might be argued that inferences involve formulae (and not sets of them) as conclusions. In this case, the
conclusion should be read as a single formula, or the singleton of a single formula. All the results below carry over
to this approach without loss of generality. The generalization of the Reflexivity and Monotonicity conditions
on p-consequence, as they apply to the multiple-conclusion framework, was to the best of our knowledge first
discussed in [8, p. 245], which surely builds on [38] and related works. Thanks to an anonymous referee for
asking us for clarification in this regard.
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1
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0
We take, additionally, the functions → and ↔ to be definable via the usual definitions, i.e.
A→ B =def ¬(A ∧ ¬B) and A↔ B =def (A ∧B) ∨ (¬A ∧ ¬B).
Definition 2.7 ([14]). A 3-valued ST-matrix is a p-matrix
MST = 〈{1, 1
2
, 0}, {1}, {1, 1
2
}, {f¬K, f∧K, f∨K}〉
such that 〈{1, 12 , 0}, {f¬K, f∧K, f∨K}〉 is the 3-element Kleene algebra.
Notice that for M a p-matrix, defining what it means for an M-valuation v to satisfy a
formula can be rather fishy. In particular, we may distinguish two different ways in which a
formula might be satisfied by a valuation, i.e. if the said valuation assigns it a value in D+, or
if the valuation assigns it a value in D−. These notions could be set to correspond, respectively,
to whether the given formula is regarded as a premise or as a conclusion. Whether a formula
is valid—i.e. whether it is satisfied by every valuation—will have, therefore, two corresponding
precisifications. However, in what follows when we talk about satisfaction, satisfiability or
validity of (a collection of) formulae, it will be the latter notion that we will be employing.
These considerations, when instantiated in relation to systems extending ST, will render that a
formula (collection of formulae) is satisfied by a valuation if and only if such a valuation assigns
it (all of its members) the truth-value 1 or 12 . The usual definitions of satisfiability and validity
then ensue from these clarifications.5
Let us now quickly move from the logic ST to the transparent theory of truth STTT. We
will consider, thus, an expansion of the language L that also includes a unary truth predicate
Tr, and we will furthermore require of STTT valuations that they satisfy Transparency, i.e.
that for all A, where 〈A〉 is a name for sentence A
v(Tr〈A〉) = v(A) (Transparency)
To valuations induced by the Kleene algebra, which additionally satisfy Transparency we
refer to as Kleene-Kripke valuations. Understood this way, in particular, the following is a
characterization of inferential STTT validity
STTT Γ⇒ ∆ iff for every valuation v
{
if v(B) ∈ {1} for all B ∈ Γ
then v(A) ∈ {1, 12} for some A ∈ ∆
This is not, however, the only interesting way to look at inferential validity for STTT. In
fact, an alternative presentation of the previous semantic phenomenon highlights how closely it
is related to Classical Logic (CL, for short).
STTT Γ⇒ ∆ iff there is no valuation v such that
{
v(B) ∈ {1} for all B ∈ Γ and
v(A) ∈ {0} for all A ∈ ∆
Thus, as noted in [36], [14], [16], [35] and many other places, these remarks imply among other
things that every valid inference of Classical Logic is valid in this logic.
Fact 2.8. An inference is valid in STTT iff it is valid in CL
5We would like to thank an anonymous referee for urging us to clarify these matters.
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However, STTT is not exactly every bit as classical as Classical Logic itself. Sure, since
CL cannot non-trivially handle a transparent truth-predicate, as Tarski showed, some sacrifices
must be made so that the inclusion of such a linguistic device does not break havoc. This is
in fact the case, for in the context of STTT some classically valid meta-inferences—the most
salient of which is the structural rule of Cut—are lost or rendered invalid, as the following
remarks show.
Definition 2.9 ([21]). A meta-inference or meta-sequent on L, written Γ⇒1 A, is an ordered
pair (Γ, A) where Γ ⊆ SEQ(L) is finite and possibly empty and A ∈ SEQ(L).
Definition 2.10. For M a p-matrix, an M-valuation v satisfies a meta-inference Γ ⇒1 A,
written v M Γ⇒1 A, by letting
v M Γ⇒1 A iff if v M B for all B ∈ Γ, then v M A
A meta-inference Γ⇒1 A isM-valid, written M Γ⇒1 A, by letting
M Γ⇒1 A iff for allM-valuations v, v M Γ⇒1 A
As is easy to check, this definition renders the structural rule of Cut invalid, i.e.
Γ, A⇒ ∆ Γ⇒ A,∆
Γ⇒ ∆ Cut
along with, e.g. the following meta-inferences, respectively called Meta-Modus Ponens (MMP,
for short) and Meta-Explosion (MEXP, for short)
Γ⇒ A→ B,∆ Γ⇒ A,∆
Γ⇒ B,∆ MMP
Γ⇒ A,∆ Γ⇒ ¬A,∆
Γ⇒ B,∆ MEXP
which brings the opportunity to mention a number of things.
First, that as the discussion provided in [3], [35] and [21] shows, the invalid nature of these
meta-inferences portrays STTT as being a close cousin to Priest’s LP—or, perhaps more accu-
rately, to the transparent theory of truth LPTT. In particular, in [3] the authors point to the
fact that every invalid inference (e.g. transitivity for the conditional, Explosion, Modus Ponens,
etc.) in the theory of truth based on this logic, i.e. in LPTT, has a corresponding invalid
meta-inference in the non-transitive theory of truth STTT (e.g. Cut, Meta-Modus Ponens,
Meta-Explosion, etc.). This is precisely established in [21] through a suitable translation.6
Fact 2.11. A meta-inference is valid in STTT iff the corresponding inference is valid in LPTT
Second, that along with recovering the safe instances of Cut in STTT, we might also want to
aim at recovering the safe instances of the previous invalid meta-inferences and, more generally,
of all the meta-inferences that are invalid in STTT although valid in CL.
Third, that even if numerous classically valid meta-inferences are invalid in STTT, even
Cobreros, Egré, Ripley and van Rooij are of the opinion that they should not be regarded as
invalid simpliciter—which makes the recovery project even more interesting to pursue. In fact,
we can see that e.g. [16] makes some qualifications with regard to the failure of Cut.
6For a more detailed account of this translation function and the importance it has in establishing the relevant
results, see [21]. For a more detailed analysis of how the failure of e.g. Meta-Explosion are linked with the
paraconsistency of a given logic, see [2].
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This non-transitivity, though, is quite limited. In fact, it is restricted to cases where
paradoxical sentences rear their heads, in a quite particular way (...) So there is a
fully precise sense in which the only failures of transitivity STTT allows for arise in
paradoxical cases. Outside the realm of what Kripke calls the paradoxical, transitivity
is perfectly safe. [16, our emphasis, p. 6]
This implies that restricted versions of the aforementioned meta-inferences where all or at
least some crucial sentences are assumed to be non-paradoxical or non-pathological—and thus
to receive classical truth-values—are indeed valid. Hence, it seems natural to wish that these
facts can be properly expressed within the language of the theory itself, i.e. to have some means
to express that when the involved sentences are assumed to be non-pathological, nothing logical
needs to be lost. Sadly, this is something that cannot be done within STTT, for the system
has no linguistic resources which can play this role. Designing a way to supplement this system
in order to accomplish this task will be our goal in what follows.
3 Recovering Cut (and much more)
Our proposed way to achieve the goal of recovering Cut and all the classically valid meta-
inferences that are invalid in STTT will be to supplement the target theory with a unary recov-
ery operator ◦A intended to mark those formulae to which Cut (and all other meta-inferences)
can be safely applied—obtaining therefore a conservative expansion of the previous system.
First, regarding our recovery project, we shall require that we recover a particularly safe or
gentle version of Cut, which is restricted to formulae that are assumed to receive a classical
truth-value.7
Γ, A⇒ ∆ Γ⇒ A,∆ ⇒◦A
Γ⇒ ∆ Gentle Cut
Secondly, we shall also demand that we recover safe or gentle versions of the otherwise invalid
meta-inferences previously referred to as Meta-Modus Ponens and Meta-Explosion (we refer to
these gentle versions, respectively, as GMMP and GMEXP, for short).
Γ⇒ A→ B,∆ Γ⇒ A,∆ ⇒◦A
Γ⇒ B,∆ GMMP
Γ⇒ A,∆ Γ⇒ ¬A,∆ ⇒◦A
Γ⇒ B,∆ GMEXP
Third, and finally, we shall prove that this can be done for every classically valid meta-inference
that is invalid in STTT. But before turning to show that indeed all this can be accomplished
in the system we will be presenting in this section, let us discuss a pressing question that might
worry some readers: Given a Kleene-Kripke valuation, which sentences deserve to be marked
with the recovery operator?
Since STTT is a theory of truth built using Kleene-Kripke valuations, this question is equiv-
alent to the question: Given a Kleene-Kripke valuation, which sentences are non-pathological?
It is a well-known fact that there is no general answer to this question. The particular answers
to it depend, actually, on two choices. On the one hand, the particular ground model on top of
which the Kleene-Kripke valuations are built, i.e. the set of sentences that are assumed from
7To answer an anonymous referee’s question concerning how and where A needs to be marked with the
recovery operator in the meta-inferences above, we shall highlight that the sentence ◦A must always appear
in the right-hand side of the sequent ⇒◦A, which gently accompanies the classically valid although ST-invalid
meta-inferences discussed above. This is, precisely, because ⇒◦A is meant to represent the fact that it is true
that A has been assigned a classical value.
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scratch to be true, or false. On the other hand, the particular fixed-point chosen to determine
the extension and anti-extension of the truth-predicate, i.e. the set of sentences that are taken
to be true, or false, or pathological, after the inductive definition of the truth predicate reaches
a fixed-point.
With regard to the former choice, if we are working with an arithmetical theory as the base
theory for a transparent theory of truth, it is usual to let the ground model be an arithmetical
model and, hence, to let the true sentences of the ground model be those—and only those—that
are true in a given set of arithmetical models. But this is not mandatory and nothing prevents us
from including some pathological sentence, e.g. the Truth-Teller, among the sentences that are
taken to be true from the very beginning. With regard to the latter choice—that of one fixed-
point among the minimal, the intrinsic, the various maximal, etc.—it is well known that Kripke
adopted an open-minded policy towards this issue, as registered for example in the following
quote.8
Nor is it even my present purpose to make any firm recommendation between the
minimal fixed point of a particular valuation scheme and the various other fixed
points (...) My purpose is rather to provide a family of flexible instruments which
can be explored simultaneously and whose fertility and consonance with intuition
can be checked. [28, p. 712]
The upshot of these reflections is, therefore, that there is no absolutely general way of
determining which are the non-pathological sentences according to the Kleene-Kripke valuations
and, thus, of determining which sentences ought to be marked with the recovery operator. At
this point one may ask: does this mean the recovery project is pointless?
We do not think so. For, although we cannot exhaustively pin down a set of sentences that
can be marked with the recovery operator, we can still recover all the meta-inferences valid in
CL but not in STTT by reasoning under the assumption that some of the featured sentences
are non-pathological. In this vein, the above gentle versions of Cut, Meta-Modus Ponens and
Meta-Explosion can be seen as claiming that if the premise-sequents for the regular versions of
these rules hold and additionally some of the sentences involved are non-pathological, then the
conclusion-sequent holds.
This allows us to draw a genuine parallel with the work done on Logics of Formal Incon-
sistency (LFIs, for short) as carried out e.g. in [11, 12, 10, 9].9 Logicians working in the LFIs
tradition think of their logical frameworks as recovering classical reasoning when working under
the assumption that some of the sentences in question are consistent [9, p. 18]. Similarly, work
within our intended extension of STTT can be thought as recovering classical reasoning—i.e.
as recovering all classical meta-inferences—when working under the assumption that some of
the sentences in question are non-pathological.
8Notwithstanding these remarks, let us notice that there are some sentences which can be undoubtedly
classified as pathological, regardless of these particular choices. One such example is, as expected, the Liar
sentence.
9LFIs are powerful paraconsistent logics that fix an interesting distinction between contradictions and incon-
sistencies. More formally, a logic L is an LFI iff there is some possibly empty set of formulae ◦(A) depending on
A such that the following conditions are met:
There are some some Γ, A,B such that:

2L Γ, A,¬A⇒ B
2L Γ, ◦(A), A⇒ B
2L Γ, ◦(A),¬A⇒ B
And, yet, for all Γ, A,B, it is the case that L Γ, ◦(A), A,¬A⇒ B.
LFIs go back to Newton da Costa’s work on C-systems in [20] and [19], but were later developed in a systematic
way by W. Carnielli, J. Marcos, M. Coniglio and others in their seminal papers [11], [10].
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Moving forward towards our aim, then, let STTT◦ be the extension of STTT with a unary
operator ◦A, equipped with the following truth-table.
f◦
1 1
1
2 0
0 1
In what follows, we will prove that every meta-inference that is valid in CL and is invalid
in STTT can be recovered in STTT◦. Such a general proof will have, as a corollary, that
the gentle versions of Cut, Meta-Modus Ponens and Meta-Explosion detailed above are valid in
STTT◦.
As an introduction to this general result, let us highlight that its comprehensive nature shows
that we are offering nothing more than a sort of Derivability Adjustment Theorem (DAT, for
short). In general, DATs show how a weaker logic can be used to recover the inferential behavior
of a stronger logic, with the help of some assumptions concerning the sentences involved. The
essential intuition behind such theorems was first incarnated in the Belgian approach with the
aid of adaptive logics, e.g. in [4], and later in the Brazilian approach with the aid of LFIs.
The former way permits to show how, assuming in the meta-theory the consistency of some
sentences, classical reasoning can be recovered in the context of an otherwise non-monotonic
reasoning. As we said earlier, the latter way allows showing how, assuming in the theory the
consistency of some sentences, classical reasoning can be recovered in the context of an otherwise
paraconsistent reasoning.
In our case, we adopt a maneuver that explicitly states in the theory the assumption that
some of sentences involved are non-pathological.10 In doing so, we will prove that all classical
meta-inferences can be recovered in the context of an otherwise non-transitive (and hence, meta-
inferentially speaking, non-classical) reasoning.
Definition 3.1. For every formula C ∈ FOR(L), let At(C) be the set of propositional variables
appearing in C. Additionally, let Γ ⊆ SEQ(L) and A ∈ SEQ(L) be such that Γ = {Σi ⇒ Ci |
1 ≤ i ≤ n}, Σi = {B1i , . . . , Bmi} and A = Σ⇒ C. From these, we define the following sets
At(Σi) =
⋃
{At(B1i), . . . ,At(Bmi)} At(Σi ⇒ Ci) = At(Σi) ∪ At(Ci)
At(Γ) =
⋃
{At(Σ1 ⇒ C1), . . . ,At(Σn ⇒ Cn)} At(Γ⇒1 A) = At(Γ) ∪ At(A)
Fact 3.2. Let At(Γ⇒1 A) be {p1, . . . , pk}, then the following holds
CL Γ⇒1 A iff STTT◦ Γ,⇒◦p1, . . . ,⇒◦pk ⇒1 A
Proof. Assume, without loss of generality, that Γ = {Σi ⇒ Ci | 1 ≤ i ≤ n} and A = Σ⇒ C.
LTR: Assume that for every valuation v of CL, if v satisfies every premise sequent Σi ⇒ Ci
in CL, then v satisfies the conclusion sequent Σ ⇒ C in CL. Consider, now, a valuation v
of STTT◦ that satisfies every Σi ⇒ Ci and also every ⇒◦pj (for 1 ≤ j ≤ k). Thus, every
propositional letter pj (for 1 ≤ j ≤ k) in the meta-inference will be such that either v(pj) = 1
or v(pj) = 0. It is easy to notice that, then, v is also a CL valuation which satisfies every
Σi ⇒ Ci. Given this, we know that v satisfies the conclusion Σ⇒ C in CL, which implies that
10We are not looking for optimal conditions for the DAT, but only for sufficient conditions. In doing so, we
mimic the strategy followed by J.C. Beall in [5] and assume that every formula in the meta-inference gets a
classical truth-value.
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v satisfies Σ ⇒ C in STTT◦. Thus, v cannot be a counterexample to the meta-inference in
STTT◦, whence it is valid in it.
RTL: Assume that for every valuation v of STTT◦, if v satisfies every premise sequent
Σi ⇒ Ci and⇒◦pj (for 1 ≤ j ≤ k) in STTT◦, then v satisfies the conclusion sequent Σ⇒ C in
STTT◦. Consider, now, a valuation v of CL that satisfies every premise sequent Σi ⇒ Ci. It is
easy to notice that this is also a STTT◦ valuation which satisfies every Σi ⇒ Ci and also every
⇒◦pj (for 1 ≤ j ≤ k). From the latter we infer that v(◦pj) = 1, for 1 ≤ j ≤ k. Thus, every
propositional letter pj (for 1 ≤ j ≤ k) in the meta-inference will be such that either v(pj) = 1 or
v(pj) = 0. Given our initial assumptions, we know that v satisfies Σ⇒ C in STTT◦, which by
the above information that no formula is assigned the value 12 in v, entails that either v(B) = 0,
for some B ∈ Σ, or v(C) = 1. But this will amount to the sequent Σ⇒ C being satisfied in CL.
Whence, v cannot be a counterexample to the corresponding meta-inference in CL, whence it
is valid in it.
Thus, we have established that we are able to recover within STTT◦ every classically valid
inference that is invalid in the non-transitive theory of truth STTT. But as everyone acquainted
with the literature on naïve theories can anticipate, this is not even nearly enough. Notwith-
standing the importance of the previous remarks, there is still a crucial question which remains
to be asked: is the resulting theory non-trivial? We will answer this shortly, but not before
introducing some subtleties regarding the way in which self-reference is achieved in the non-
transitive theory of truth in question. That is to say, the answer to the target question—i.e. is
STTT◦ non-trivial?—will depend on how self-reference and self-referential sentences, such as
the Liar, the Truth-Teller, etc. are represented.
Thus, to formally mimic the self-referential character that some sentences like “This sentence
is in English” or more prominently “This sentence is false” have, there seems to be two main
technical options: through a strong or through a weak procedure. The latter option achieves
this goal by requiring a self-referential sentence to be equivalent to a sentence that “talks about”
the first one. The former involves an essential use of identities. This strong alternative, either
(i) requires a term to be identical to the name of a sentence that “talks about” the first term,
or (ii) involves a meta-linguistic denotation function from names to sentences of the language
that have occurrences of that name in it. In what follows, we will take the notational liberty of
calling a theory Th that uses a weak self-referential procedure as Thw and—analogously—one
that uses a strong self-referential procedure as Ths.
These options might be instantiated by a plethora of technical means, varying from one
framework to another. Sometimes these procedures can be present “in” the theories in question,
e.g. if they are extensions of arithmetical theories codifying their own syntax. In such a case,
self-reference may be either achieved through a strong or a weak procedure, i.e. through the
strong Diagonal Lemma, or the weak Diagonal Lemma—as recently remarked by Lavinia Picollo
in [31]. Thus, for example, a Liar sentence obtained through the strong Diagonal Lemma will
be represented by a term l which is identical to the Gödel code p¬Tr(l)q. Whereas, a Liar
sentence obtained through the weak Diagonal Lemma will be represented by a sentence L which
is equivalent to the sentence ¬TrpLq.11
Nevertheless, in some other opportunities these ways of obtaining self-reference do not come
with the theories, in which case they can be “imposed from the meta-language” to the theories
in question, e.g. by restricting their valuations. For example, the way self-reference is achieved
in e.g. [17] and [36] constitutes for us a case of the implementation of a meta-linguistic strong
procedure. In both of these works, the valuations of the target theory of truth are supplemented
11This allows to answer an anonymous referee’s question as to whether arithmetical theories codifying their
own syntax provide strong or weak procedures to obtain self-reference
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with a denotation function, later restricting the resulting valuations to those guaranteeing the
existence of certain pathological sentences which denote sentences that talk about themselves.
For instance, in the referred works, a Liar sentence is represented by a sentence L, only if the
term 〈L〉 denotes the sentence ¬Tr〈L〉 via the corresponding denotation function.
Alternatively, achieving self-reference by an implementation of a similar—although weak—
meta-linguistic procedure may also be possible. To this extent, the valuations of the target
theory of truth should be restricted to those guaranteeing the existence of certain pathological
sentences which are equivalent to sentences that talk about themselves. For instance, in such a
case a Liar sentence may be represented by a sentence L, only if L is equivalent to the sentence
¬Tr〈L〉. This is, precisely, the route we are going to pursue in Section 4.
Going back to STTT, we may notice that it is often presented using a strong self-referential
procedure to achieve self-reference. For instance, [36] implements a meta-linguistic denotation
function working as detailed in the previous paragraphs—but for another alternative discussion
of a strong self-referential procedure applied to STTT, see [22]. Whence, we can rightfully say
that the discussion of this system has been actually focused, at least until now, in STTTs.12
These facts concerning how self-reference is achieved will be essential to our discussion of the
triviality or non-triviality of STTT◦. For, as we observe, the theory STTT◦s , i.e. the system
resulting from supplementing STTTs with a unary recovery operator ◦A, is indeed trivial.
Fact 3.3. STTT◦s is unsatisfiable.
Proof. The proof is simple, by considering a usual Strengthened Liar sentence S, such that
e.g. 〈S〉 denotes ¬Tr〈S〉 ∧ ◦Tr〈S〉. We will show that there is no stable assignment of truth
values—i.e. no valuation—for Tr〈S〉. If v(Tr〈S〉) = 0, then v(¬Tr〈S〉 ∧ ◦Tr〈S〉) = 1, and so
v(Tr〈S〉) = 1. If v(Tr〈S〉) = 1, then v(¬Tr〈S〉 ∧ ◦Tr〈S〉) = 0, and so v(Tr〈S〉) = 0. Now, if
v(Tr〈S〉) = 12 , then v(¬Tr〈S〉 ∧ ◦Tr〈S〉) = 0, and so v(Tr〈S〉) = 0.
The previous triviality result for STTT◦s suggests that there are two immediate options
(I) either giving up some expressive requirements (such as having a recovery operator)
(II) or giving up the strong self-referential procedure.
In the rest of the paper, we will discuss the latter option. In doing this, we will be exploring
the prospect of changing the way to achieve self-reference in a non-transitive theory of truth,
using some weak self-referential procedure, i.e. establishing self-reference via equivalences and
not via identities.
4 The Goodship Project, revisited
In what follows, we are going to show how it is possible to prove the non-triviality of our target
non-transitive theory of truth STTT◦w, which is able to recover all the meta-inferences that are
valid in CL although they are not valid in STTT.
12In their paper [16], Cobreros, Egré, Ripley and van Rooij work with STTT on top of an arithmetical theory
capable of codifying its own syntax. Although they assume that such a theory can prove the existence of the
usually problematic pathological sentences—allegedly, by instantiating either the strong or the weak Diagonal
Lemma—they do not make any explicit case concerning the particular procedure employed in obtaining such
results. In other words, the authors do not make any explicit clarification concerning whether the pathological
sentences that they talk about (e.g. the Liar sentence) are obtained via the strong or the weak Diagonal Lemma.
Our discussion and our results below can be taken as stating that if the former is the case—i.e. if in [16] the
authors are entertaining STTTs—then the theory cannot be non-trivially extended with a recovery operator.
This is, precisely, why in what remains of the paper we recommend taking the latter route. We would like to
thank an anonymous referee for urging us to clarify these issues.
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Given the previous triviality results for STTT◦s , as we recently advertised, our positive result
will rely heavily on the implementation of a weak self-referential procedure to express or represent
pathological sentences such as the Liar, the Truth-Teller, Curry and possibly others—including
potential revenge-like sentences. By a weak procedure we mean that the self-referential character
of these sentences will be portrayed via equivalences—through some suitable biconditional— that
talk about them.
In this vein, it is important for us, before presenting the actual non-triviality result for
STTT◦w, to highlight how our effort here originates from a suggestion that Laura Goodship
gave more than twenty years ago to build non-trivial naïve theories, e.g. transparent theories
of truth.
In her 1996 paper [25], Laura Goodship stated that there was an option for those working
with naïve theories to avoid triviality: they should express the corresponding naïve comprehen-
sion axioms using a suitable biconditional. Given that A ↔ B are standardly defined as the
conjunction of the two conditionals A → B and B → A, she emphasizes that what actually
needs to be suitable is the corresponding conditional. But what does it mean for a conditional
to be suitable, so that non-triviality is granted? By this Goodship means that the connective
in question should be non-classical to a certain extent: it should either (i) invalidate Modus
Ponens, or (ii) invalidate Absorption (sometimes also called Contraction) for the conditional. In
[5, p. 332], Beall refers to theories pursuing the former route, as theories located within what
Priest and him call the Goodship Project.
Ever since Goodship outlined these options, many have followed her recommendations,
whether implicitly or explicitly—the ones most explicitly inspired by these suggestions being
[29], [1] and [34]. For example, Beall [5], [7] has recently advocated a detachment-free paracon-
sistent approach, where he embraces the failure of Modus Ponens displayed by paraconsistent
logics such as LP. Similarly, Horsten [27] essentially advocates a dual strategy in a paracom-
plete setting, by abandoning Contraction for the conditional—although in his case this route is
followed independently of the Goodship’s suggestions. Omori [29] also proposed an extension
of paraconsistent set-theory based on LP which essentially employs a biconditional without
Modus Ponens to express self-reference. This was later carried over in the field of transparent
theories of truth by Barrio, Pailos and Szmuc in [1], using a close cousin of LP as the underly-
ing logic. Finally—and most saliently—recently Priest offered “an extended exploration of the
strategy [of adopting the LP-conditional to formulate the comprehension axioms], its strengths,
its weaknesses, and the various different ways in which it may be implemented” [34, p. 58].
In this essay, we do think of ourselves as continuing this tradition. However, we think we are
offering a novel point of view within this interesting family of approaches. The results of the
previous section allow us to conclude that employing a biconditional to express self-reference is
essential for the non-triviality results—in that, we agree with Goodship. In fact, in the next
section, we will be presenting a model for the transparent theory of truth STTT◦w, where to
grant non-triviality it is essential that self-reference be expressed through the STTT material
conditionals. Nevertheless, given that the material conditional in STTT is classical, meaning
that all the tautologies and inferences involving it which hold in CL also hold in STTT, this
allows us to conclude that Goodship’s recommendations were perhaps too narrow. There seems
to be no need to employ a non-classical conditional.
Let us emphasize this last point. According to our proposal, the Goodship Project should be
reformulated in this way: non-trivial naïve theories should express self-reference with a suitable
biconditional, avoiding to use identities or a meta-linguistic function. But, for the biconditional
to be suitable, we must not require that it be non-classical. In fact, it can be completely classical,
if the structural properties of the logic are modified adequately. For instance, as the semantics
for our theory STTT◦w witnesses below, the use of the biconditional in expressing self-reference
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is essential for the non-triviality of the theory, the biconditional employed is classical—but this
combination is guaranteed not to be harmful because the logic is non-transitive.
This seems, to us, to offer a completely novel option within the Goodship Project. The
attractive feature of this route is that it is not necessary to abandon the classicality of the target
biconditional to generate self-reference in the context of naïve theories and, more specifically, of
transparent theories of truth.
4.1 A non-triviality result for STTT◦w
Our target theory of truth STTT◦w is non-transitive, has a transparent truth-predicate, and
counts with a recovery operator that helps regain all the classically valid but ST-invalid meta-
inferences. Still, we need to show that this system accomplishes this task while appropriately
dealing with pathological phenomena.
To this extent, it may be helpful for the reader that we advance that establishing the non-
triviality result below will require proving two things. On the one hand, that there is a STTT◦
valuation compatible with the existence of pathological sentences constructed via a weak self-
referential procedure and, on the other hand, that this valuation does not satisfy every formula.
Proving that there is an STTT◦ valuation compatible with the existence of pathological
sentences constructed via a weak self-referential procedure is not that straightforward. The
reason is that we are not working with an extension of an arithmetical theory that codifies its
own syntax, and thus must adopt some alternative technique to guarantee that pathological
sentences are around. As we previously said, this will be done by restricting the valuations of
the theory to those where some sentences are equivalent to sentences that talk about themselves.
In such a framework, then, a Liar sentence will be represented by a sentence that is equivalent
to a sentence saying that it is false. Similarly, a Curry sentence will be represented by a sentence
that is equivalent to a sentence saying that if it is true, then everything follows. And so on, and
so forth.13
Thus, we will construct a set called PseudoDL (short for “Pseudo Diagonal Lemma”), includ-
ing all sorts of equivalences between sentences, and sentences involving semantic predications
about themselves. We will, furthermore, restrict the STTT◦ valuations to those satisfying Pseu-
doDL. This will allow us to fulfill our first requirement, showing that there is a STTT◦ valuation
compatible with the existence of pathological sentences constructed via a weak self-referential
procedure. In what follows, we give the details of how to construct the set PseudoDL.14
First, we will need to distinguish an infinite proper subset of the set of propositional vari-
ables that we will later mark—in the metalanguage—with a *. This last move is not essential,
though. But putting a mark to those distinguished propositional letters will make things easier
to understand, as those propositional letters will play a key part in the self-referential procedure
we are about to present. Thus, we will refer to the members of that set as e.g. p∗, q∗, etc.
Secondly, we build a set called PseudoDL which only includes sentences of the form
p∗ ↔ Ap∗
where p∗ is a distinguished propositional variable and Ap∗ is a sentence that has at least one
instance of Tr〈p∗〉 as a subformula. This approach allows for pathological sentences of all sorts.
In fact, instantiation on Ap∗ in the context of the above biconditional statement will exemplify
13By no means are we claiming that this is the best, the most elegant or the preferable way to achieve this
goal. We are just saying that this is one possible way. Many other alternatives might be available or not, and
we would be more than happy to consider them. But for the sake of the present discussion, the following will
suffice.
14Of course, one may be even more liberal than we are in building PseudoDL. Here we just depict one possible
approach.
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every self-referential sentence that includes a truth predicate. For example, if t∗ ↔ Tr〈t∗〉 is in
PseudoDL, then we are allowed to say that t∗ is a Truth-Teller sentence, and if c∗ ↔ Tr〈c∗〉 → ⊥
is in PseudoDL, then we are allowed to say that c∗ is a Curry sentence. In particular, we will be
able to express or represent the traditional pathological cases (The Liar, Curry, the Truth-Teller,
etc.) but also possible new pathological sentences including the recovery operator. Thus, e.g. if
s∗ ↔ ¬Tr〈s∗〉 ∧ ◦Tr〈s∗〉 is in PseudoDL, then s∗ is a Strengthened Liar sentence.
Thirdly, concerning the schema above, we will pair each distinguished propositional variable
p∗ with one and only one formula-schema Ap∗ . Thus, if we have that t∗ ↔ Tr〈t∗〉 belongs
to PseudoDL, we will not have that t∗ ↔ Tr〈t∗〉 ∨ ⊥ belongs to PseudoDL. Moreover and
simultaneously, we will pair each formula-schema Ap∗ with at least one of the distinguished
propositional variables. Thus, if t∗ ↔ Tr〈t∗〉 belongs to PseudoDL, this does not prevent e.g.
u∗ ↔ Tr〈u∗〉 from belonging to PseudoDL, too. This will render the existence of at least one
Liar, one Truth-Teller, one Curry, one Strengthened Liar, etc., depending on the initial choices
one makes.
Finally, we will simply restrict the set of the STTT◦ valuations to the ones that satisfy each
member of PseudoDL. This allows us to show that there are STTT◦ valuations compatible
with the existence of pathological sentences. Let us refer to the resulting theory as STTT◦w.
To show the non-triviality of this theory, we need something more. We need to show that there
is at least one STTT◦w valuation which does not satisfy every sentence.
To put it in the terms of our recent discussion, we need to show that there is a STTT◦
valuation which satisfies every member of PseudoDL and yet does not satisfy every sentence.
This is what we show next. Recall that, as per our discussion of satisfaction in this non-transitive
approach in Section 2, a formula (collection of formulae) is satisfied by a valuation if and only
if such a valuation assigns it (all of its members) the truth-value 1 or 12 .
Fact 4.1 (Non-Triviality). There is a STTT◦w valuation, for which not every sentence is sat-
isfied.
Proof. Consider the valuation v that assigns to every propositional letter the value 12 , and
hence to every distinguished propositional letter p∗ the value 12 . We first confirm that such a
valuation satisfies every member of PseudoDL, i.e. we check that every biconditional p∗ ↔ Ap∗
in PseudoDL will receive either the value 1 or the value 12 . This is true, precisely because of
the way in which the ST biconditional is defined. Next, we show that not every sentence is
satisfied by this valuation. In particular, let r∗ ↔ ¬Tr〈r∗〉 be a member of PseudoDL, so that
r∗ can be regarded as a Liar sentence. Then, consider the formula ◦r∗, for which we know that
if v(r∗) = 12 , then v(◦r∗) = 0. Thus, we have a formula that is not satisfied by v.15
It is easy to see that the use of biconditionals in expressing self-reference is what puts this
particular theory, STTT◦w, on the path that Laura Goodship described to avoid triviality. After
all, the difference between the triviality of STTT◦s and the non-triviality of STTT◦w is due,
precisely, to the way in which self-reference is expressed. While in the former it is expressed
through a strong procedure, in the latter it is expressed through a weak procedure. What is
peculiar of this solution is, though, that the biconditional employed to express self-reference is
just ST’s material biconditional, and not any other introduced further.
But it may be instructive to illustrate just how the use of biconditionals in expressing self-
reference is what puts this particular theory, STTT◦w, on the path that Laura Goodship de-
scribed to avoid triviality. In other words, it may be interesting to understand how employing
biconditionals in expressing self-reference in STTT◦w is the key to avoiding the triviality result
of Fact 3.3. This can be exemplified as follows. Take, for example, a Strengthened Liar S like
15We would like to thank Dave Ripley for discussion concerning this result.
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the one used to prove the triviality result for STTT◦w in the said Fact 3.3. If we assume, as it is
done in that context, that S denotes ¬Tr〈S〉 ∧ ◦Tr〈S〉, necessarily Tr〈S〉 and ¬Tr〈S〉 ∧ ◦Tr〈S〉
are assigned the same truth-value. Given that this is impossible for appropriately constructed
revenge paradoxes, triviality ensues.
However, in the context of theories expressing self-reference through a weak procedure—an
example being our own theory STTT◦w—a Strengthened Liar sentence like the above would
be represented by a sentence s∗ assumed to be equivalent to ¬Tr〈s∗〉 ∧ ◦Tr〈s∗〉. This, in
itself, does not require that both of these sentence have the same truth-value, but merely
that they are assigned some truth-values which guarantee the satisfaction of the equivalence
s∗ ↔ ¬Tr〈s∗〉∧◦Tr〈s∗〉. (In the case of the valuation provided in the proof above, just assigning
s∗ the value 12 will suffice. Then, even if the right side of the biconditional will get value 0, the
biconditional itself will get value 12 .) The same holds for all the remaining pathological sentences
which cause trouble for STTT◦s but not for STTT◦w, as shown in the non-triviality result for
STTT◦w above. There is a valuation which guarantees that pathological sentences are around
and that, still, not every sentence is satisfied.
The upshot of this section is that to obtain the desired non-triviality result for the target
theory STTT◦w, it is essential to employ a weak self-referential procedure to guarantee the exis-
tence of pathological sentences.16 Nevertheless, non-triviality is a necessary but not a sufficient
condition to obtain an interesting theory. In particular, one could question whether or not this
theory is a better option than its actual competitors within the Goodship Project. To this
discussion we now turn.
4.2 Philosophical reflections
Having proposed a new alternative within the Goodship Project, we must now discuss whether
our theory STTT◦w fares better than the competitors in its own family. Prime among them
is the non-detachable approach represented by LP, which is of special interest due to Graham
Priest’s dedicated study of this option, recently published as [34]. Thus, in what follows we will
be comparing these two alternatives.
However, to compare different options one needs several criteria to rank them, and in fact
comparisons between different approaches to transparent truth have appeared in the literature
in several forms and shapes. As Hjortland [26] points out, it is usual to compare transparent
theories of truth by evaluating their grades of classical involvement. According to him
classical theories typically try to recapture the transparency of truth in special cases,
while nonclassical theories try to recapture classical principles in special cases. This
is a form of damage control. The target theories should revise the problematic
principles while preserving sufficiently strong restricted versions. In short, most
formal theories of truth are developed after the ‘maxim of minimal mutilation’. [26,
p. 1, our emphasis]
This criterion suggests that the non-classical theories of truth should preserve properties of
Classical Logic, if possible.17 Thus, we might as well compare the Goodship Project based on
LP to the alternative based on ST.
16An anonymous referee wonders whether or not this counts as an expressive limitation of this approach. In a
way, our results imply that the use of a strong self-referential procedure to express self-reference—e.g. through
identities—should be avoided, if one wishes to recover the classically valid meta-inferences without falling into
triviality. This expressive limitation is a price to pay, if identity is a classical notion. If one wishes to express
self-reference through a strong procedure, though, one available option would be to explore non-classical accounts
of identity, like the one discussed by Graham Priest in [33].
17Although, as remarked by an anonymous referee, some of the arguments presented above—e.g. those to
the extent that our theory enjoys the unrestricted validity of Modus Ponens whereas rival theories do not—lend
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So let us focus, first, on the logical truths of Classical Logic: there, both the theories of truth
based on LP and ST fare equally well, since both preserve all the tautologies of CL. Hence,
at the level of the tautologies these approaches have nothing to recapture. However, when we
look at the inferences that are valid in Classical Logic, things start to be different: while the
inferences of ST are completely classical, meaning that they coincide with those valid in CL,
this is not the case when we talk about LP. The upshot is that, regarding ST, there is nothing
to recapture concerning the inferences, whereas in the case of LP this is mandatory—and, in
fact, some efforts in this direction were done in naïve theories based on LP or some related
systems e.g. [29], [34] and [1].
Concerning the classically valid inferences that LP-based approaches fail to validate, we
can focalize the discussion in a very important point, intimately related to the behavior of
conditionals in the context of LP. As is well known, the conditional of LP is too weak to be
taken seriously. More importantly, when talking about transparent theories of truth, it is not
only in formulating the self-referential sentences that conditionals play an essential role, but also
in formulating the T-Scheme. Thus, if the conditional involved in these tasks is without Modus
Ponens, it does not seem to be a real conditional—as Priest himself acknowledged in a recent
paper.
[T]he material conditional (and biconditional) do not detach. So, given only the
material T-scheme, one cannot infer A from Tr〈A〉, or vice versa. Now, we cer-
tainly do seem to reason using detachment in this way. Thus, for example, as many
have noted, one function of the T-scheme would appear to be to make endorsement
possible in contexts where this cannot be done explicitly. [34, p. 66]
In this vein—as an anonymous referee emphasizes—if a system counts with a conditional→ that
fails to validate Modus Ponens or the transitivity of the conditional, this raises the suspicion
whether, within this theory, a statement of the form A↔ B expresses a real equivalence.18
Restricted universal quantification is another important aspect of a naïve theory of truth
where the failure of detachment of the LP-based approach spills into. That this approach has
difficulties in this regard is made evident when looking at the phenomenon of blind endorsement.
That is, of the ascription of truth to sentences that are identified in a way which gives no
clue about their content (e.g. when someone holds that everything the Bible says is true).
For instance, while saying “All of the axioms of Peano Arithmetic are true”—formalized as
∀x(Ax(x)→ Tr〈x˙〉)—we would endorse all of an infinite number of claims, granted the axioms
are infinite in number. Given that ∀x∀y(x′ = y′ → x = y) is an axiom of Peano Arithmetic,19
we may infer that Tr〈∀x∀y(x′ = y′ → x = y)〉, but if a non-detachable conditional is at play, one
cannot be sure that it will be legitimate to infer that. Much to the contrary, our proposal based
on ST avoids these difficulties completely. The conditional built in ST is essentially employed
to express self-reference, however it not only allows Modus Ponens to apply unrestrictedly, but
is also a completely classical conditional, at the inferential level. So, among other things, it
interacts correctly with generalizations in contexts in which one uses transparent truth.
One may want to avoid these shortcomings by supplementing the LP-based approach with
some sort of recovery technique. Among the salient options in this regard we find that of Beall
[6], where a device based on Priest’s [32] notion of “shrieking” is developed. Beall argues that
one may adopt an extra-logical rule of inference—called a shriek rule—allowing one to express
support to our approach even if we do not implicitly assume that Classical Logic sets some sort of standard that
ought to be respected.
18This idea parallels Zardini’s claim in [45], with regard to vagueness phenomena, that the failure of Modus
Ponens in LP deprives the validity of tolerance principles of their intended force.
19Where, of course, ′ is the successor function and = is the identity relation.
15
by meta-theoretical tools that a particular sentence A is consistent, by adding to the system
the rule A ∧ ¬A  ⊥. Thus, we can recover the full steam of CL even for restricted universal
quantifications, by applying the shriek rule to the formulae appearing in the antecedent of such
quantifications.
Of course, it is easy to observe how this technique can be applied to areas like arithmetic,
which are, allegedly, free of contradiction. However, it is a little more difficult to see how
this mechanism can be applied to sentences involving the truth predicate, which constitute the
most interesting cases for us. Presumably, there will be sentences appearing in the antecedent
of restricted universal quantifications which feature the truth predicate and are, nevertheless,
non-pathological. But there is no principled way to tell them apart from the pathological ones.
Thus, the technique cannot be applied with full generality on pain of triviality. Consequently,
no restricted universal quantification featuring the truth predicate in its antecedent will be able
to detach its consequent. If this is the case, then, sentences like “Everything Aristotle says
which is true, is also clear”—formalized as ∀x((Arist(x)∧Tr〈x˙〉)→ C(x))—cannot be properly
handled inside his account. Much to the contrary, nothing like that happens in our theory,
as our conditional is inferentially speaking perfectly classical, even in contexts where the truth-
predicate appears. This, we think, is yet another advantage of our account against the remaining
alternatives.
In sum, the Goodship Project based on ST seems to fare better, if we take into consideration
the criterion of minimal mutilation. As Goodship predicted, it is essential to express self-
reference through equivalences and not through identities in order to stay away from the troubles
caused by paradoxes and, specially, revenge paradoxes. Our work shows that this also holds
of substructural theories, when they are supplemented with enough expressive resources such
as recovery operators. However, contrary to Goodship’s predictions, this move need not be
so problematic, for the conditional involved in expressing self-reference must not necessarily
be non-classical, i.e. non-detachable or non-contractive. We can, indeed, stick to Goodship’s
solution employing a fully classical conditional, if the underlying logic is non-transitive.
As a closing remark, let us mention that for those interested in the generality of the non-
transitive approach as a solution for many problematic phenomena like semantic paradoxes,
vagueness and more20, our discussion seems to provide evidence for the fact that the failure
of Cut is crucial to keep naïve theories from falling into triviality. Here we showed that the
substructural character of non-transitive theories is also tied to the way in which self-reference
is expressed within the system.
5 A sequent calculus
In this section, we introduce a three-sided sequent system for STTT◦w that we will call LSTTT◦w,
later proving soundness and completeness of LSTTT◦w with respect to STTT◦w. We will be
implementing a system of three-sided sequent, endowed with a disjunctive reading, as suggested
in e.g. [36]. We will first present this for STTT and then work our way up to STTT◦w.
Definition 5.1. A three-sided disjunctive sequent Γ | Σ | ∆ is satisfied by a valuation v if and
only if v(A) = 0 for some A ∈ Γ, or v(B) = 12 for some B ∈ Σ, or v(C) = 1 for some C ∈ ∆. A
sequent is valid if and only if it is satisfied by every valuation. A valuation is a counterexample
to a sequent if the valuation does not satisfy the sequent.
20For example, Cobreros, Egré, Ripley and van Rooij have pointed out that the non-transitive approach can be
applied to some metaphysical issues in [15], whereas [42] analyzes how to apply the approach to Fitch’s paradox
of knowability.
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It is easy to see that there is a strong relation between valid disjunctive three-sided sequents
and valid inferences of STTT: STTT Γ ⇒ ∆ if and only if Γ | Γ,∆ | ∆ is valid. This fact
follows from the definition of STTT’s validity and the definition of validity of a three-sided
sequent. Moreover, this facts holds the same for all the expansions of STTT that we will
present here: all of them will have theirs corresponding three-sided sequent versions.
The proof system we are about to present, called LSTTT, includes some axioms and rules,
as usual. A sequent is provable if and only if it follows from the axioms by some number (possibly
zero) of applications of the rules. As we are working with sets, the effects of the structural rules
of Exchange and Contraction are built in, and Weakening is built into the axioms.
We will have three versions of a three-sided Cut rule, and also a Derived Cut rule (that can be
inferred from the three basic rules of Cut) and that will also play a key role in the completeness
proof presented below, following [37]. Id is the only axiom-scheme of LSTTT. Cut 1, Cut 2,
Cut 3 and Derived Cut are structural rules. The rest of them are LSTTT’s operational rules.
Given that the connectives for which we do not give any rules (∨, → and ↔) can be defined in
terms of the ones for which we do provide rules, this succinct presentation is just as good.21
A,Γ | A,Σ | A,∆ Id
Γ, A | Σ | ∆ Γ | Σ, A | ∆
Γ | Σ | ∆ Cut1
Γ | Σ | ∆, A Γ | Σ, A | ∆
Γ | Σ | ∆ Cut2
Γ, A | Σ | ∆ Γ | Σ | ∆, A
Γ | Σ | ∆ Cut3
Γ, A | Σ, A | ∆ Γ | Σ, A | ∆, A Γ, A | Σ | ∆, A
Γ | Σ | ∆ Derived Cut
Γ | Σ | ∆, A
Γ,¬A | Σ | ∆ L¬
Γ | Σ, A | ∆
Γ | Σ,¬A | ∆ M¬
Γ, A | Σ | ∆
Γ | Σ | ∆,¬A R¬
Γ, A,B | Σ | ∆
Γ, A ∧B | Σ | ∆ L∧
Γ | Σ | ∆, A Γ | Σ | ∆, B
Γ | Σ | ∆, A ∧B R∧
Γ | Σ, A | ∆, A Γ | Σ, B | ∆, B Γ | Σ, A,B | ∆
Γ | Σ, A ∧B | ∆ M∧
Γ | Σ | ∆, A
Γ, | Σ | ∆, T r〈A〉 RTr
Γ | Σ, A | ∆
Γ, | Σ, T r〈A〉 | ∆ MTr
Γ, A | Σ | ∆
Γ, T r〈A〉 | Σ | ∆ LTr
Moving forward to our target proof system, LSTTT◦w works exactly like LSTTT, with the
addition of two rules for the recovery operator
Γ, A | Σ | ∆, A
Γ | Σ | ∆, ◦A R◦
Γ | Σ, A | ∆
Γ, ◦A | Σ | ∆ L◦
and two axioms-schemes for the self-referential sentences, that we will call PseudoDL1 and PseudoDL2.
Notice that, in PseudoDL1 and PseudoDL2, the expression p∗ (alternatively, Ap∗) must be the left
(alternatively, right) term of a biconditional p∗ ↔ Ap∗ that is a member of the set PseudoDL.
21This is just a version of the three-sided sequent calculi Ripley presents in [36]. None of the differences are,
for what we understand, significant ones. For example, Ripley restricts the identity axioms to atomic formula,
while our presentation does not have that restriction. (Actually, every instance of Identity will have a proof in
Ripley’s system.)
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Γ, p∗ | Σ, p∗, Ap∗ | ∆, Ap∗ PseudoDL1 Γ, A∗p | Σ, p∗, Ap∗ | ∆, p∗ PseudoDL2
Let us comment briefly on the semantic interpretation of the rules PseudoDL1 and PseudoDL2.
In a nuthsell, the validity of these rules is equivalent to the satisfaction of all the members of
the set PseudoDL. In other words, the validity of these rules is equivalent with there being
pathological sentences around when working with LSTTT◦w—a requirement indispensable for
our non-triviality result to be meaningful.22
Finally, the following are the main results concerning LSTTT◦w and STTT◦w.
Theorem 5.2 (Soundness). If a sequent Γ | Σ | ∆ is provable in LSTTT◦w, then it is valid in
LSTTT◦w.
Proof. The axioms are valid, and validity is preserved by the rules, as can be checked without
too much trouble.
Theorem 5.3 (Completeness). If a sequent Γ | Σ | ∆ is valid in LSTTT◦w, then it is provable
in LSTTT◦w.
Proof. In the Appendix.
6 Conclusion
Throughout this paper we have shown how to recover the safe instances of Cut and of all the
classically valid meta-inferences that are invalid in the non-transitive transparent theory of truth
STTT, with the help of a unary recovery operator ◦A. We have defended that the best way to
do this is by expressing self-reference through equivalences, thus placing ourselves in the context
of the so-called Goodship Project. However, even if our current approach can be located within
the Goodship Project, the point of view and the results we present are quite novel to this work.
This is so because Laura Goodship suggested that, to achieve a non-trivial naive theory, it
was essential to express all the self-referential sentences through non-classical biconditionals –
invalidating either Modus Ponens or Contraction. Contrary to this, we showed how this can be
properly achieved by using a biconditional that is completely classical, inferentially speaking,
provided the underlying logic is allowed to be non-transitive. Finally, we presented a three-sided
sequent calculus which was shown to be sound and complete with regard to our target theory
STTT◦w.
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Appendix: Completeness Proof
We will use the method of reduction trees,23 that allows to build for any given sequent, either a
proof of that sequent, or a counterexample to it. The method also provides of a way of building
the potential counterexample. We will introduce the notions of subsequent and sequent union,
that will be used in the proof:
Definition .1. A sequent S = Γ | Σ | ∆ is a subsequent of a sequent S′ = Γ′ | Σ′ | ∆′ (written
S v S′) if and only if Γ v Γ′, Σ v Σ′, and ∆ v ∆′.
23For similar proofs, see [36] and [30].
20
Definition .2. A sequent S = Γ | Σ | ∆ is the sequent union of a set of sequents [Γi | Σi | ∆i]i∈I
(written S = unionsq[Γi | Σi | ∆i]i∈I) if and only if Γ = unionsqi∈IΓi, Σ = unionsqi∈IΣi and ∆ = unionsqi∈I∆i.
The construction starts from a root sequent S0 = Γ0 | Σ0 | ∆0, and then builds a tree in
stages, applying at each stage all the operational rules that can be applied, plus Derived Cut
“in reverse”, i.e. from the conclusion sequent to the premise(s) sequent(s).24 Thus, stage 0 will
just be the root sequent S0. If it is an axiom, the branch is closed. For any stage n+ 1, one of
two following things might happen:
1. For all branches in the tree after stage n, if the tip—e.g., the sequent that is being
reduced— is an axiom, the branch is closed.
2. For open branches: For each formula A in a sequent position in each open branch, if A
already occurred in that sequent position in that branch (i.e. A has not been generated
during stage n+ 1), and A has not already been reduced during stage n+ 1, then reduce
A as is shown below. There are three possible positions in which a formula can appear in
a sequent: either (i) on the left side, or (ii) on the middle, or (iii) on the right side. We
need to consider all these possible cases.
• If A is a negation ¬B, then: if A is in the left/ middle/ right position, extend the branch
by copying its current tip and adding B to the right/ middle/ left position.
• If A is a conjunction B ∧ C, then: (i) if A is in the left position, extend the branch by
copying its current tip and adding both B and C to the left position. (ii) If A is in the
middle position, split the branch in three: extend the first by copying the current tip and
adding B to both the middle and right positions; extend the second by copying the current
tip and adding C to the middle and right positions; and extend the third by copying the
current tip and adding both B and C to the middle position. (iii) If A is in the right
position, split the branch in two: extend the first by copying the current tip and adding
B to the right position; and extend the second by copying the current tip and adding C
to the right position.
• If A is a formula ◦B, then: (i) if A is in the left position, extend the branch by copying its
current tip and adding B to the middle position. (ii) If A is in the right position, extend
the branch by copying its current tip and adding B to the right and left positions. (iii) If
A is in the middle position, then do nothing.
• If A is a formula Tr〈B〉, then if A is in the left / middle / right position, extend the branch
by copying its current tip and adding B to the left / middle / right position.25
24For the proof, we use an enumeration of the formulae and an enumeration of names. We will reduce, at each
stage, all the formulae in the sequent, starting from the one with the lowest number, then continuing with the
formula with the second lowest number, and moving on in this way until the formula with the highest number
in the sequent is reduced. In the case a formula appears in more than one side of the sequent, we will start by
reducing the formula that appears on the left side and then proceed to the middle and the right side, respectively.
The final step, at each stage n of the reduction process, will be an application of the Derived Cut rule to the
nth-formula in the enumeration. If we apply a multi-premise rule, we will generate more branches that will need
to be reduced. If we apply a single-premise rule, we just extend the branch with one more leave. We will only
add formulae at each stage, without erasing any of them. As a result of the process just described, every branch
will be ordered by the subsequent relation. Any branch that has an axiom as it topmost sequent will be closed.
A branch that is not closed is considered open. This procedure is repeated until every branch is closed, or until
there is an infinite open branch. If every branch is closed, then the resulting tree itself is a proof of the root
sequent. If there is an infinite open branch Y , we can use it to build a counterexample to the root sequent.
25As formulae that are disjunctions, conditionals and biconditionals can be defined in terms of negations and
conjunctions (remember that the conditional is just the material one), it will not be necessary to specify special
rules for them. Those cases will be subsumed in the ones already specified.
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We will also apply the Derived Cut rule at each step. Consider the nth formula in the
enumeration of formulae and call it A. Now extend each branch using the Derived Cut rule.
For each open branch, if its tip is Γ | Σ | ∆, split it in three and extend the new branches
with the sequent Γ, A | Σ, A | ∆, the sequent Γ, A | Σ | ∆, A, and the sequent Γ | Σ, A | ∆, A,
respectively.
Now we need to repeat this procedure until every branch is closed, or, if that does not
happen, until there is an infinite open branch. If the first scenario is the actual one, then the
tree itself is a proof of the root sequent, because each step will be the result of an application of
a structural or operational rule to the previous steps. If the second scenario is the actual one,
we can use the infinite open branch to build a counterexample.26
If in fact there is an infinite open branch Y , then the Derived Cut rule will have been used
infinitely many times. Thus, every formula will appear at some point in the branch for the first
time, and will remain in every step afterwards. Now, we first collect all sequents of the infinite
open branch Y into one single sequent Sω = Γω | Σω | ∆ω = unionsq {S | S is a sequent of Y }. Notice
that, as Derived Cut has been applied infinitely many times in the construction of the branch,
every formula will occur in exactly two places in Sω.27 Thus, there will be a valuation such that
no formula in the sequent gets the value associated with the place where it occurs (i.e. 0 if the
formula occurs in the left, 12 if it occurs in the middle, 1 if it occurs in the right). Hence, for
each formula A in the sequent, v will give to A a value different from the ones corresponding to
the sides where A appears in the sequent. But that includes all the formulae in the initial and
finite sequent S0. That valuation, then, will also be a counterexample to S0. Therefore that
valuation will be a counterexample to the sequent being considered.
Thus, for atomic formulae A (propositional letters and truth assertions), v(A) = 0 or 12 or
1, respectively, if and only if A does not appear in Γω or Σω or ∆ω, respectively.28
The rules for reducing formulae can be used to show by induction, that, if none of the com-
ponents of complex formulae (negations, conjunctions, disjunctions, conditionals, biconditional,
consistency and truth assertions) receive the value associated with any place in which they ap-
pear in Sω, neither will the compound. We will not see, due to limitations of space, how this
method works in detail. For conjunctions, negations and truth assertions, we proceed exactly
as is shown in [36]. The new cases are that of formulae ◦A. Thus, we will just check how that
type of assertion can be reduced.
In the cases of formulae of the form ◦A, no formula like this can appear both on the left
and the right side, because then they would have appeared for the first time in the same leaf of
the branch. When you reduced them at the next stage, you’ll get a sequent with A at the three
sides of the sequent. That sequent will be an axiom, and so will not be part of an infinite open
26As we have already mentioned, the tip is the sequent that is being reduced. If it is an axiom, then this
branch will be closed. If it is not, then the reduction process will go on. We will present a toy example to
understand exactly what the tip is. Take, for instance, the sequent  | ¬B | ¬A. In this case, this is the tip we
have mentioned. The first step of the reduction will give us the sequent  | B,¬B | ¬A. But this is not an axiom
either. So the reduction process will keep on rolling.  | B,¬B | ¬A is the new tip, and the next step of the
reduction will give us the sequent A | B,¬B | ¬A. Finally, as this sequent is not an axiom either, we will split
this new tip in three when we apply the Derived Cut rule in reverse, and the reduction process will continue.
Thanks to an anonymous referee for pushing us to clarify this point.
27It cannot occur in the three places, because then there will be some finite stage n where the formula appears
for the first time in the branch in the three sides. But then that sequent will be an axiom, and therefore the
branch will be closed.
28Does A appears in exactly the places where Tr〈A〉 appears? Yes. As any formula in sequent that corresponds
to an infinite open branch, A appears in exactly two places. If Tr〈A〉) appears in the only place where A does
not appear, then, as Tr〈A〉 will eventually be reduced, A will appear in the only place where it does not appear
until that moment in branch. But then that sequent will be an axiom, and thus the branch will be closed. This
is the only possibility that we need to consider. Tr〈A〉 can not appear in less places that A: as any formula in a
sequent corresponding to an infinite open branch, it has to appear in exactly two places.
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branch. So (i) either ◦A is both in the left and the middle sides of the sequent, or (ii) it is both
in the middle and the right side of the sequent.
Let us start with (i). At some point, ◦A will be reduced. It appears in the middle side of the
sequent, so nothing is supposed to be done when this happens. But it also appears on the left
side. If that happens, then A will appear on the middle side of the sequent on the next stage
of the construction. At some point, an application of Derived Cut will also introduce A in the
left or in the right side, and so they will also appear in that place in Sω. If A appears on the
left, then A will get value 1, an also will ◦A. If it appears on the right, then it will get value 0,
and ◦A will get value 1. Thus, in none of this cases ◦A receives a value associated with one the
sides where it appears. Now consider (ii). Once ◦A is reduced, as it is on the right side of the
sequent, that will get A on both the left and the right sides. So by inductive hypothesis, A will
get value 12 , and ◦A will get value 0. So, again, ◦A will not receive a value associated with the
sides where it appears.
By completing the induction along these lines, we can show that we can construct a valuation
such that no formula receives the value associated with any place where it appears in Sω. But,
as we know, that includes all the formulae in the initial and finite sequent S0. That valuation,
then, will also be a counterexample to S0, which is what we were looking for. Thus, for any
sequent S, either it has a proof or it has a counterexample.
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